“If you believe morality is subjective, not objective, please supply evidence for subjectivity—without relying on any objective claims.”
The Trap Few See Coming
In conversations about faith and morality—especially online—you’ll often hear someone say, “Morality is subjective.” They might follow that up with, “There’s no right or wrong, just preferences,” or “Who are you to judge another person’s values?”
But here’s the problem: the moment they say things like, “We should respect others,” or “It’s wrong to impose your views,” they’ve contradicted themselves.
You cannot defend subjective morality by using objective moral language. You can’t say morality is nothing but preference, then turn around and tell people what they ought to do.
That’s not just inconsistent—it’s self-refuting.
Let me put the challenge plainly:
If you believe morality is subjective, please supply evidence for that subjectivity—without using anymoral claims that you expect others to accept.
Because the second you tell someone what they should do, or what’s wrong or unjust, you’ve appealed to something outside your own preferences. You’ve crossed into objectivity. And that’s where your position collapses.
Syllogism: The Self-Refutation of Subjective Morality
Let’s reduce this to formal logic:
- If morality is subjective, then no moral claim can be universally binding.
- Any argument for subjective morality that uses universal moral language (e.g., “You shouldn’t judge,” “Tolerance is better,” “Don’t impose your values”) implies that at least one moral claim is objectively true.
- Therefore, arguments for subjective morality that rely on moral prescriptions are self-refuting.
When the Subjectivist Becomes the Preacher
We’ve all seen it. Someone says, “There’s no moral truth,” and then turns around and says:
- “Christians are immoral for opposing same-sex marriage.”
- “It’s wrong to evangelize—let people believe what they want.”
- “You shouldn’t judge others.”
- “Everyone deserves dignity and respect.”
But wait—if morality is subjective, those aren’t truths. They’re opinions. Preferences. Taste.
They’re no more binding than saying, “I prefer chocolate over vanilla.”
And yet, they’re being delivered as imperatives. As if we are morally obligated to agree.
That’s the giveaway.
If you’re appealing to what someone should or shouldn’t do—you’re not a relativist. You’re assuming that moral truth exists outside yourself. And now the burden is on you to explain where that truth comes from.
Spoiler: you’ve just walked into the very worldview you said you rejected.
Subjectivism Can’t Explain Moral Outrage
Moral relativists tend to get outraged a lot—and that outrage gives them away.
Why? Because when you say morality is relative, you’re saying there’s no ultimate standard—only personal or cultural ones.
But ask yourself: do you believe slavery was actually wrong? Do you believe the Holocaust was objectively evil? Do you believe racism is not just “culturally frowned upon,” but inherently unjust?
If so, then you’re not a moral relativist. You’re a moral objectivist.
Because if you say morality is just what your culture approves of, then Nazi Germany wasn’t wrong—they were just different.
If you say morality is just personal preference, then there’s no meaningful difference between a sadist torturing a child and a person feeding the hungry—both are just “doing what they like.”
But if that leaves you sick to your stomach, good. That’s your conscience pointing to something deeper: that some things really are right, and some really are wrong, no matter who disagrees.
The Problem with Cultural Relativism
Let’s push this further. Suppose someone says, “Each culture determines its own moral code. There’s no objective standard.”
But if that’s true, then:
- You can’t say Western society has made moral progress.
- You can’t criticize a past culture for slavery or child marriage.
- You can’t say we’ve improved—only changed.
That makes “progress” a meaningless term.
Imagine this: In 1850, a culture says slavery is right. In 2025, it says slavery is wrong. If there’s no objective standard, you can’t say we got better—just different.
That’s absurd. We know better. There was a right answer all along. And some people were wrong.
C.S. Lewis said it clearly:
“A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line.”¹
You Can’t Be Morally Neutral
One popular trick is to say, “I’m not telling anyone what’s right or wrong. I just believe everyone should decide for themselves.”
But again—look closer.
That sentence contains a moral imperative: “Everyone should decide for themselves.” There’s that word: should.
You’ve just declared a moral rule that you think applies to everyone.
You’re not morally neutral. You’re just sneaking in your morality under a different name.
And once again, you’ve refuted your own claim.
Borrowed Capital: Atheism Needs Objective Morality to Function
Let me put it bluntly: Atheists and moral subjectivists borrow Christian capital every time they open their mouths to condemn something as unjust.
Because in an atheistic or purely material universe, what standard do you use?
You can’t appeal to human dignity—because if we’re just evolved animals, dignity is an illusion.
You can’t appeal to fairness—because nature isn’t fair. The strong dominate the weak.
But What About ‘Do Unto Others’?
Another popular response is the appeal to empathy: “Just ask yourself how you’d want to be treated, and treat others the same.” But that only works if there’s a shared assumption that people ought to treat others as they’d want to be treated. The Golden Rule, as Jesus taught it (Luke 6:31), assumes moral obligation—it doesn’t emerge from preference; it confronts it. Besides, one person’s preferences don’t create moral duties for someone else. A sadist might say, “I’d want to be hurt, so I’ll hurt you,” and a masochist might agree. Does that make it moral? No. Doing unto others requires more than guesswork and sympathy. It requires a moral foundation. And preference isn’t enough.
You can’t appeal to rights—because rights don’t exist in nature. They’re just social agreements. And social agreements change.
As atheist philosopher Michael Ruse admitted:
“Morality is a biological adaptation no less than hands and feet and teeth… Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction… and any deeper meaning is illusory.”²
In other words, if atheism is true, morality is a useful fiction.
But no one lives that way.
We still act as though people matter. We still cry out against injustice. We still believe that some things are evil—not just inconvenient.
And that’s the problem. Moral relativism might work in theory. But no one can live it out. Not honestly. Not consistently.
The Real Question: Where Does Objective Morality Come From?
If you agree that morality must be objective—then you face a deeper question: Where does that morality come from?
It can’t come from evolution, because evolution produces what helps you survive, not what’s morally right.
It can’t come from society, because societies differ wildly—and have done horrifying things.
It can’t come from personal opinion, because personal opinions contradict.
There’s only one answer that makes sense: morality is grounded in something bigger than human beings.
Something that transcends us.
Someone.
The Problem with ‘Human Well-Being’ as a Moral Standard
Some will try to dodge the God question by appealing to “human well-being” as a moral baseline. They’ll say, “Whatever promotes human flourishing is good; whatever harms it is bad.” But this is just kicking the can down the road. Why is human well-being valuable? On what basis do we say that helping people flourish is morally better than watching them suffer—especially if, in some cases, one group flourishes at another’s expense? Evolution doesn’t care about flourishing—only survival. Nature has no pity. If we say human well-being is good, we are already smuggling in a moral assumption that demands explanation. Once again, we’ve borrowed from objective morality without admitting it.
The God revealed in Scripture is not just good—He is the standard of goodness itself. His nature defines what is right, just, and true.
That’s why morality feels like something outside us—because it is. It reflects the moral lawgiver who created us.
As Romans 2:15 puts it:
“They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness…”³
That’s why we feel moral guilt—not just social discomfort. Because there’s a real moral law. And we know we fall short of it.
Why This Matters
Some will say, “Why make such a big deal about whether morality is objective or subjective? Just let people live.”
But here’s why it matters:
If morality is objective, then there is such a thing as good and evil, justice and injustice. And we are accountable.
If morality is subjective, then all your outrage, all your convictions, all your claims about fairness and dignity—they’re just noise. Personal preferences. Easily discarded.
This is not a small disagreement. This is the foundation of everything we believe about right and wrong, justice and mercy, repentance and forgiveness.
The next time someone says, “Morality is subjective,” offer them the challenge:
Please supply evidence for subjectivity—without relying on any objective moral claims.
And then watch closely.
Because if they say, “Well, we shouldn’t force our views on others,” you’ll know exactly what to say:
“You just did.”
Addition: The Argument from Moral Self-Refutation
Thesis
Moral subjectivism is self-refuting because it relies on the use of objective moral claims to justify itself.
Syllogism #1: The Internal Contradiction
- If morality is subjective, then no moral claim can be universally binding.
- Any defense of moral subjectivism that relies on statements like “You shouldn’t impose your morality,” “We should tolerate all views,” or “Everyone deserves respect” is making a universal moral claim.
- Therefore, any defense of moral subjectivism that appeals to moral obligations is self-refuting.
Syllogism #2: Human Well-Being Is Not an Objective Standard
- If moral values are grounded in human well-being, then one must first justify why human well-being is intrinsically valuable.
- In a godless or naturalistic worldview, there is no objective reason to prioritize human flourishing over suffering, since evolution and nature are indifferent.
- Therefore, appeals to human well-being as a moral foundation assume what they must prove and borrow from objective morality.
Syllogism #3: Preference Cannot Ground Obligation
- If morality is based on personal or cultural preference, then no one is morally obligated to follow another’s preference.
- The Golden Rule (e.g., “Treat others how you want to be treated”) assumes a universal obligation, not merely a preference.
- Therefore, using the Golden Rule as a moral guide presupposes objective moral duties that cannot be grounded in subjectivism.
Conclusion
Anyone who says “morality is subjective” and then makes statements like “you should be tolerant,” “racism is wrong,” or “don’t force your beliefs on others” is no longer speaking as a relativist but as an objectivist.
Challenge:
If you believe morality is subjective, please supply evidence for subjectivity—without relying on any moral claim that you believe others ought to accept.
Every time someone fails that challenge—and they will—they prove the point.
Endnotes
- C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperOne, 2001), 45.
- Michael Ruse and E.O. Wilson, “The Evolution of Ethics,” New Scientist 108, no. 1478 (1985): 50.
- The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2016), Romans 2:15.
Tom's Theology Blog 
Leave a comment